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QUESTIONING THE RETROACTIVITY OF
CERCLA IN LIGHT OF LANDGRAF V USI FILM
PRODUCTS
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).' Proponents claimed that the RCRA would
close the "last remaining loophole in environmental law."2 A notable
loophole of the RCRA, however, was its failure to address the
problem of inactive sites in need of cleanup On December 11, 1980
Congress attempted to address this issue by enacting the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).4 The purpose of CERCLA was to promote
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-992k (1994).
2. James A. Resila, Note, The Retroactive Application of CERCLA: Pre-Enactnent
Response Costs, 1 FORDHAM ENVrL. L. REP. 69, 72 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at
4, (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241).
3. Resila, supra note 2, at 72 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. Environmental catastrophes such as Love Canal
spurred Congress into action. Karin Oliva, Note, Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 68 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1417, 1417 (1995). During the course of hearings, "Congress estimated that industry
annually disposed of one hundred billion pounds of hazardous waste, the equivalent of six
hundred pounds per person-ninety percent of it improperly." Id. (citing 126 CoNG. REC.
26,342 (statement of Rep. Gore). For a more detailed discussion of congressional intent, see
infra notes 47-50, 65-68 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). The relevant section for this Recent Development is
section 9607(a), which, in relevant parts, reads as follows:
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the cleanup of hazardous waste sites at the expense of the polluter;'
however, by not enacting a retroactivity provision that would hold
polluters liable for their pre-enactment acts, Congress failed to
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal of treatment of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from such a
release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
5. See Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 51 F.3d 1489,
(9th Cir. 1995) (noting Congress enacted CERCLA to "facilitate the prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those
responsible for hazardous wastes") (quoting United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1500 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating that Congress designed CERCLA "to force polluters to pay for costs associated
with remedying their pollution"); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F.
Supp. 1545, 1552 (S.D. Ala. 1995) (noting "the essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place
the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poison") (international quotations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Vermont
American Corp., 871 F. Supp. 318, 323 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (stating that CERCLA's two
overriding objectives are cleaning up hazardous waste and doing so at the expense of those who
created the harmful condition) (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1247 (6th Cir. 1991)). See also H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a hazardous
substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2) to hold
responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups.").
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manifest its intent of forcing polluters to clean up their hazardous
waste.6 Moreover, CERCLA's legislative history is not very
insightful.7 Yet a large majority of courts have agreed that CERCLA
imposes liability on responsible parties for the commission of pre-
enactment acts.8
With the Supreme Court's refinement of the retroactivity standard
in Landgraf v. USI Film Product,9 many began to question the
retroactive application of CERCLA.' 0 Applying Landgraf, an
Alabama federal district court in United States v. Olin Corp.1 was the
first court to rule that CERCLA's liability provisions are not
applicable to the cleanup of hazardous waste dumped before
6. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response. Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. I
(1982).
[Congress considered CERCLA] in the closing days of the lame duck session of an
outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after very limited debate, under a
suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a
complicated bill on a take it-or-leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.
Id.
7. See Resila, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that CERCLA "was hastily written and
supplied its readers with little legislative history"). See also infra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Goodwin California Living
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied. 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987);
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 748 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1990); United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Ottati &
Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064
(D. Colo. 1985).
9. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
10, See, e.g., John R. Jacus & Jan G. Laitos, May CERCLA Apply Retroactively?, 25
COLO. LAW. 103, (Oct. 1996); Editorial, Dump Superfund, DET. NEws, June 26, 1996, at A8.
11. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (4th Cir. 1997). For a
detailed discussion the district court's opinion, see Tenn, Judge Rejects Olin, Finds CERCLA
Retroactive, Not Unconstitutional, 9 No. 18 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 4, Dec. 16,
1996; Case Notes, CERCLA, 12 NO. 4 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRAT. 7, Sept. 1996;
US. District Judge: Pre-1980 Waste Not Subject to Sf [Superfund]; DOJ to Appeal,
AIR/WATER POLLUTION REPORT'S ENVT. WEEK, May 31, 1996, available in 1996 WL
7981479.
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Congress enacted CERCLA.'2 On expedited appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that "clear
Congressional intent" demonstrated CERCLA's retroactive
application.' 3 Between the two Olin decisions, five district courts also
continued to retroactively apply CERCLA. 4
Because the Eleventh Circuit is the first federal appellate court to
apply Landgraf to CERCLA, this Recent Development closely
examines Olin and the five district courts that similarly held that
CERCLA should continue to be applied retroactively under
Landgraf. Part I of this Recent Development provides a brief analysis
of Landgraf. Part II scrutinizes the Eleventh Circuit's and the five
district courts' decisions to apply CERLA retroactively under
Landgraf. Part III proposes that Congress enact an express
retroactivity provision to eliminate any doubt regarding CERCLA's
retroactivity.
12. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1519.
13. Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512. For a more detailed discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion, see SuperfundRuling May Spur Compromise in Congress, BEST'S INS. NEws, Mar. 31,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7077611; Mark A. Hoffian, Appeals Court Upholds Retroactive
Liability: Olin Loses Superflnd Case, BUS. INS., Mar. 31, 1997; Richard M. Kuntz, Appeals
Court Puts Bite Back in CERCLA, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 31, 1997.
14. The five district court cases that have refused to follow Olin are: Ninth Ave. Remedial
Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-
CV-1 132, 1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1996); Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-
CV-0748, 1996 WL 550128 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996); Nevada ex rel. Department of Trans.,
925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996) [hereinafter NDOT]. For a more detailed discussion of these
five cases, see Enforcement: Court Rules Contrary to Olin Decision, Says Congress Intended
Retroactivity, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Dec. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13939522;
New York Judge Finds CERCLA Retroactive and Constitutional, 9 No. 16 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: SUPERFUND 7, Nov. 18, 1996; New York Judge Finds CERCLA Constitutional,
Retroactively Applied, 9 No. 13 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 3, Oct. 7, 1996.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RETROACTIVITY PRINCIPLE AND
LANDGRAF4'
Justice Story stated that a law applies retroactively when it
"'creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past."' 6
A century later, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Laramie Stock
Yards Co.'7 the Supreme Court formulated the presumptive rule
against the retroactive application of statutes as follows:
the first rule of construction is that legislation must be
considered as addressed to the future, not to the past... The
rule has been expressed in varying degrees of strength but
always of one import, that a retrospective operation will not be
given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights or by
which human action is regulated unless such be the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature."
Despite the apparent simplicity of the Laramie presumptive rule
against retroactivity, the Supreme Court decided to clarify further the
rule regarding the retroactive application of statutes in Landgraf.
In Landgraf, the Court grappled with the issue of whether the
punitive damages remedy, the compensatory damages remedy, and
the right to jury trial provisions adopted in the Civil Rights Act of
15. For a more detailed analysis of Landgraf, see Nelson Lund, Retroactivity, Institutional
Incentives, and the Politics of Civil Rights, 1995 PUB. INTEREST L. REv. 87; Linda B. Contino,
Comment, Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Landgraf v. USI Film Products and
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 541 (1995); Janine M. Weaver, Note,
Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1061
(1995); Leonard Charles Presberg, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Retroactivity, and
Continuing Violations: The Effect of Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v. Roadway
Express, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1363 (1994); Kelli D. Taylor, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of
1991 and Retroactivity: Do Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc. Signify a New Era of Restrictive Employment Discrimination Cases?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 773 (1994).
16. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814).
17. 231 U.S. 190(1913).
18. Id. at 199 (internal quotation omitted).
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1991 1 were available in Title VII cases that were pending on appeal
at the time Congress enacted the statute.20 The Court held that none of
the three provisions should be retroactively applied.2' Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens first discussed the well-established principle
that the retroactive application of statutes is disfavored.22 Justice
Stevens then noted that the cornerstones of the presumption against
retroactivity are congressional intent to have laws retroactively
applied and the paramount importance of protecting the rights of
private parties.'
In light of the history and rationale of the presumption, Justice
Stevens set forth the test to determine whether a statute should be
retroactively applied.24 Initially, a court should determine whether
Congress expressly indicated its preference favoring or opposing
19. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
20. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488. The statute at issue in Landgrafwas 42 U.S.C. §
1981a (1994), which is entitled "Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in
employment." Section 198 la, in relevant part, reads as follows:
(a) Right of Recovery
(1) Civil Rights
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination . . . and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under
section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages ....
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of Punitive Damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent... if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights ofan aggrieved individual ....
(c) Jury Trial
Ifa complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury ....
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
21. SeeLandgraf I14 S. Ct. at 1488.
22. See id. at 1497 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) and
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842-44, 855-56 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
23. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501-05 (discussing the history of the presumption against
statutory retroactivity).
24. See id.
[Vol. 52:437
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retroactivity.' An express prescription of congressional intent ends
the inquiry.6 If Congress has not manifested its intent, the traditional
presumption against attaching legal consequences to events that
occurred before the statute's enactment governs, absent "clear
congressional intent" demonstrating otherwise.27
Applying the test to the facts of Landgraf, the Court ruled that
Congress did not provide an express retroactivity instruction.
Therefore, the Court held that the punitive damages, compensatory
damages, and right to jury trial provisions of section 1981a do not
apply retroactively." Moreover, the Court found that there was no
clear congressional intent favoring retroactivity.29 Furthermore, the
statute's legislative history demonstrated that Congress and President
Bush clashed over the enactment of a retroactivity provision."° The
Court found that its omission was likely the result of compromise
between Congress and President Bush.3' Moreover, the punitive
damages, compensatory damages, and right to jury trial provisions of
section 1981a adversely affected the previous exercise of appellee's
rights, demonstrating the retroactive effect of the statute without any
indication that Congress intended such an effect.32
25. See id. at 1505.
26. See id.
27. See id. Justice Stevens defined a statute as having retroactive effect when "it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id.
28. See id. at 1506.
29. See Landgraf 114 S. Ct at 1495-96.
30. See id. at 1491-92. President Bush vetoed the 1990 version of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 citing the unfairness of a retroactivity provision as one of the reasons for his veto. See id.
at 1492 n.9 (citing President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP,. PRES. DOC. 1632-34 (Oct. 22, 1990)). See also Scott M.
Pearson, Canons, Presumptions and Manifest Injustice: Retroactivity of the Civil Rights of
1991, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 461,463 (1993).
31. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1492.
32. See id. at 1505-08. For example, the punitive damages provision, which authorizes
punitive damages in certain cases, is clearly subject to the presumption against retroactivity
because of its criminal nature. See id at 1505. Moreover, the Court implied that the punitive
damages provision came close to violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. (citing De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ("The mark of an expostfacto law is the imposition of what
can fairly be designated punishment for past acts.")).
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II. POST-LANDGRAF DECISIONS UPHOLDING THE RETROACTIVITY OF
CERCLA
A. United States v. Olin
Olin Corporation operated two chemical plants between 1952 and
1982, which caused serious contamination of the company's
property.33 Therefore, a vast majority of the pollution caused by the
Olin corporation occurred before Congress enacted CERCLA.34 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered and assessed the
pollution and contamination caused by Olin in 1984."5 After several
years of negotiating, the Department of Justice and Olin agreed to a
consent agreement holding Olin, its officers, directors, and all
associated agents liable for the cost of compliance.36 The parties
submitted the consent agreement to the district court where Olin
argued that, given the Landgraf decision, it should not be held liable
under CERCLA.37 Olin argued that CERCLA should not be
retroactively applied pursuant to Landgraf even though Olin
voluntarily consented to the agreement.38 The district court agreed
with Olin, ruling that CERCLA does not apply retroactively.
3 9
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress twice
reauthorized CERCLA, once with major changes, without
commenting that courts have misconstrued the retroactivity of the
statute.4" Nonetheless, the Olin court's primary consideration was the
application of the analytical framework set forth by the Supreme
33. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1504; see also Kathleen Hellevik & Christine Younger,
CERCLA Liability Not Retroactive, Alabama Judge Rules, WEsT'S LEGAL NEWS, June 19,
1996, at 5868 (available in 1996 WL 336054).
34. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1504.
35. See id,
36. The EPA estimated Olin's compliance costs at $10,339,000. See id. at 1505.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1505-06.
39. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1502.
40. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-49, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
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Court in Landgraf to determine retroactivity." Under Landgraf the
Eleventh Circuit sought "clear congressional intent" favoring
retroactivity because CERCLA's liability does not contain an
"express statutory command" regarding retroactivity. 2 To discern
congressional intent, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed CERCLA's
language, purpose, and legislative history.43
First, the Eleventh Circuit examined CERCLA's language. A
plain reading of the statute creates liability on owners or operators of
sites where hazardous waste had been deposited at the time of
disposal without any reference to the date of deposit.' By failing to
set a date when hazardous waste deposits do not fall under
CERCLA's liability scheme strongly suggests that Congress intended
not to exclude pre-enactment deposits.45 Reading CERCLA in pari
materia, the Eleventh Circuit cited CERCLA section 103,46 the
natural resources provision, as evidence that pre-enactment owners
41. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512-14 (citing Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1505). See supra Part I
for a discussion of Landgraf
42. Olin, 107 F.3d at 1512 (quoting Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501, 1505).
43. See id. at 1512-13. On the other hand, the district court broke down its analysis into
three parts: (1) has Congress expressed its intent on CERCLA's retroactivity?; (2) does
CERCLA have retroactive effect?; and (3) is the presumption against retroactivity applicable to
CERCLA? See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1512-19.
44. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1513 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)).
45. See id. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion diametrically opposed the district court's
holding. The district court found that although CERCLA referred to actions and conditions in
the past tense, it did not demonstrate the "imperative character" that would be dispositive of
Congress' intent favoring retroactivity. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1513 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Brown
v. Georgeoff, 563 F. Supp. 1300, 1310-11 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (noting that the word "accepted" in
§ 9607 (aX4) may apply to pre-enactment conduct although CERCLA "does not require such an
application")).
46. Section 103 provides that:
Within one hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, any person who owns
or operates or who at the time of disposal owned or operated ... a facility at which
hazardous substances ... are or have been stored, treated, or disposed of shall...
notify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of
such facility, specifying the amount and type of any hazardous substance to be found
there, and any known, suspected, or likely releases of such substances from such
facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9603(c). The provision further mandates that persons who were former owners and
operators make the required notification regarding their pre-enactment conduct within six
months, or forfeit "any defenses to liability set out in section [107] of this title." See id.
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and operators would bear cleanup costs. 47 Congressional placement of
an express retroactivity provision in the natural resources provision,
which is located in the same section of CERCLA, follows Landgrafs
rule favoring examination of other relevant provisions and
disfavoring reliance on minor and narrow provisions in a long and
complex statute like CERCLA.4' Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected Olin's argument that CERCLA only reaches "future former
owners and operators," or in other words, pre-enactment polluters.49
Next, the Eleventh Circuit considered CERCLA's purpose. While
all parties agreed that Congress designed CERCLA to deal with
contamination that preceded the statute's enactment, the parties
disagreed about who should pay the cleanup costs.50 Contrary to
Olin's argument that Congress intended for taxpayers in both
industry and the general public to bear cleanup costs, the Eleventh
Circuit held that an essential purpose of CERCLA places the ultimate
responsibility on polluters.5 The court also cited CERCLA's other
essential purpose to clean up pre-enactment pollution.5" Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded in order to carry out CERCLA's two
essential purposes, it must be retroactively applied.53 Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit repeated the Landgraf clear intent standard,
requiring more than realizing that "retroactive application of a new
statute would vindicate its purpose more fully" and held CERCLA's
47. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1513. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the foregoing provision
as an express mandate that CERCLA addresses pre-enactment conduct because it requires
former owners and operators to notify the EPA ofpre-enactment conduct or to forfeit defenses
listed in § 9607. See id.
48. See id. at 1513 (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1493).
49. Olin, 107 F.3d at 1513.
50. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514.
51. See id See also supra note 5.
52. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514.
53. See id. In contrast, the district court stated that its refusal to apply CERCLA
retroactively would not completely halt the cleanup of pre-enactment pollution because
Superfund provided alternate means to remove pollution. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1518-19.
"Landgraf mentioned established means such as taxes and zoning regulations by which
governments 'impose burdens on past conduct.' Such means, if not otherwise unconstitutional,
allow legislators to 'remedy' past conduct." Id. (quoting Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499).
Therefore, CERCLA would not by rendered ineffective; instead, it would be tailored to meet the
environmental problems Congress intended to address. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1519.
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retroactive enforcement prevents frustration of its purposes. 4
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit searched CERCLA's limited
legislative history for clues regarding retroactivity.55 Although
CERCLA's predecessor bill, S. 1480, contained no express
retroactivity provision, Congress agreed that it would apply
retroactively, incorporated the cleanup liability provisions of S. 1480
into CERCLA, and made statements favoring retroactivity. 6
Moreover, no member of Congress complained about retroactivity
during the argument over the final passage of CERCLA,
demonstrating clear congressional preference for retroactivity. 7
B. Five District Courts
Like Olin, the five cases that refused to follow Olin58 involved
property owners who sought to avoid paying cleanup costs for pre-
enactment pollution. 9 But the five courts had fundamentally different
54. Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514 (quoting Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1507-08).
55. See id. The district court interpreted CERCLA's legislative history much differently.
See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1513-16. The Olin court noted the reason for the lack of legislative
history was due to "[t]he delicate nature of the compromise" which preceded the enactment of
CERCLA. id. at 1514 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SuPERFuND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510
VII (Comm. Print 1983)). See also supra note 6. Specifically, the district court reasoned that
Congress' hasty drafting and enacting of CERCLA, its awareness that the issue of retroactivity
could arise, and its complete failure to address the issue, demonstrates congressional intent to
allow courts and the EPA to decide the fate of CERCLA's retroactivity. See Olin, 927 F. Supp.
at 1514-16. See also supra note 7.
56. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514 (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION
AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, at 344 (Committee Report) (noting that S. 1480 contained a
subsection limiting "how claims for certain damages occurring before the date of enactment will
be handled," but observing that "[c]osts of removal (cleanup and containment) are not affected
by this provision"); at 405 ("The legislation proposed would establish liability for costs
expended by the government to clean up past disposal practices that today are threatening
public health and the environment, and it does so without reference to prior standards."
(statement of Administrator Costle)).
57. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514 (citing Appellee's Brief at 24).
58. Seesupra note 14.
59. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 653; Nova Cherns., 945 F. Supp. at 1099; Alcan, 1996
WL 637559, at *1; Cooper Indus., 1996 WL 550128, at *2-*4; NDOT, 925 F. Supp. at 692.
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rationales for their holdings. The five courts relied on a combination
of congressional intent,6' CERCLA's text,6' and CERCLA's
legislative history62 to overcome the presumption disfavoring
retroactivity.
When Congress enacted CERCLA its primary goal was to cure the
problem of past pollution of hazardous wastes.63 Direct evidence in
the form of statements by members of Congress' and congressional
inquiries into sites of past pollution in dire need of cleanup 65
demonstrated Congress' intent to cleanup pre-enactment pollution. In
addition, Congress sought to build upon RCRA to improve
environmental protection.66
The text of CERCLA provides several additional reasons why
Congress clearly intended the retroactive application of CERCLA.
First, Congress' use of the past tense in CERCLA's liability
provisions must refer to pre-enactment acts.67 Similarly, Congress
declined to place a temporal limitation on CERCLA's scope, thus
60. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
63. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 662-63 (quoting SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
(SUPERFUND), PB. LAW 96-510 239 (Comm. Print 1983). "There are two major aspects to the
problem [of hazardous waste]: First, the prospective dumping, that is, dumping that will occur
in the future. Second, dumping that has already occurred in the past .... What we are
addressing in this legislation is the dumping that occurred in the past." Id. at 661 (remarks by
Rep. Gore); Nova Chems., 945 F. Supp. at 1104 (citing United States v. R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d
1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989).
64. See supra notes 5, 56.
65. See Alcan, 1996 WL 637599, at *4; Cooper Indus., 1996 WL 550128, at *9. Both
cases discussed Love Canal and that the fifty-three largest domestic chemical manufacturers
dump 94% of their waste on their plant sites. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 20 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6123. See also supra note 3.
66. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 661 (stating that "[RCRA] ... regulated the future
dumping of waste, but the law did not provide authority to deal with existing dump sites where
disposal had taken place before RCRA"). See supra notes 3, 5, 65.
67. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 658; Alcan, 1996 WL 637559, at *4; Cooper Indus.,
1996 WL 550128, at *9; NDOT, 925 F. Supp. at 697-98 (citing United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986). The courts focused on the words
"owned and operated" in § 9607(a)(2), "arranged" in § 9607(a)(3), and "accepted" in §
9607(a)(4).
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indicating that it may apply to past conduct.6 Another reason is a
negative inference that can be drawn by comparing the Natural
Resources Liability provision of CERCLA69 and section 9607(a).70
Congress expressly inserted a prospectivity clause in the natural
resources provision but placed no temporal restriction in section
9607(a). Because Congress chose to limit some damages provisions,
those provisions without any temporal limitation can be inferred to
apply retroactivity and prospectively.7' In addition, the courts agreed
not to use an "effective date clause" analysis. 2 The Supreme Court
rejected the effective date clause analysis in Landgraf73
The courts relied on House Report 1016 to analyze the legislative
history of CERCLA.74 House Report 1016 expressly stated that the
purpose of CERCLA was to cleanup "inactive hazardous waste
sites.""5 The use of the word inactive necessarily meant that
CERCLA dealt with sites where pollution had occurred in the past.
Likewise, House Report 1016 noted that RCRA's inadequacy and
growing public concern over existing environmental problems were
the catalysts that spurred Congress to enact CERCLA.76
68. See Alcan, 1996 WL 637559, at *4 (stating that CERCLA's "past tense language is
without a temporal limitation as to its scope"); Cooper Indus., 1996 WL 550128, at *9 (stating
that CERCLA's language refers to time of disposal without a temporal limit on the language).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) ("There shall be no recovery under.., this section where
such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages have resulted
have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980.").
70. See Nova Chems., 945 F. Supp. at 1101; NDOT, 925 F. Supp. at 701 (quoting Shell
Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1076 (stating that if Congress intended to apply CERCLA only
prospectively, "the limiting provisions of [§ 9607(f)] would be mere surplusage")).
71. See id
72. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 657-58; NDOT, 925 F. Supp. at 695. In fact, the Ninth
Ave. court cited cases demonstrating that other courts agree that an effective date clause neither
proves nor disproves retroactivity. See Ninth Ave., 946 F. Supp. at 657 (citing Moore v.
Califano, 633 F.2d 727, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1980); Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d
406,409 (5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980)).
73. See Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1493.
74. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119. See
Cooper Indus., 1996 WL 550128, at *9; NDOT, 925 F. Supp. at 703.
75. HR. REP. No. 96-1016, at 1. (stating that the purpose of CERCLA is "to establish
prohibitions and requirements concerning inactive hazardous waste sites [and] to provide for
liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites").
76. See H.R REP. No. 96-1016, at 17-18. See also supra notes 3, 66 and accompanying
text for a discussion of congressional intent to enact CERCLA to improve RCRA.
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III. ENACTMENT OF AN EXPRESS RETROACTIVITY PROVISION
Congress could easily resolve this issue in the same manner it has
addressed previous retroactivity issues-by enacting an express
retroactivity provision. Congress should pursue a course similar to
the one it followed when it approved the retroactive application of the
Reorganization Act.77
The Reorganization Act of 197778 authorized the President to
reorganize executive departments and agencies subject to a
"legislative veto" by either the house of Congress. 79 One year later,
President Carter submitted a plan to Congress to reorganize and
expand the EEOC's functions, including transferring to the EEOC
enforcement and administrative authority over the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).0 However, in INS v.
Chadha8" the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Congress'
ratification of the reorganization plans under the Act. 2 Subsequently,
the Second Circuit refused to permit the EEOC to enforce the ADEA;
however, it stayed the judgment and granted Congress the
opportunity to address the problem. 3
Likewise, Congress should enact a retroactivity provision
expressly stating that CERCLA should be retroactively applied. The
retroactivity provision should read as follows: Congress hereby
declares that CERCLA section 107 applies to the dumping of
hazardous waste before December 11, 1980; thereby holding liable
77. See Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192
(1984).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29. See William Alan Shirley, Note, Resolving Challenges
to Statutes Containing Unconstitutional Legislative Veto Provisions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1808
(1985); Tracy Pool, Comment, The Status of Statutes Containing Legislative Veto Provisions
After Chadha-Does the EEOC Have the Authority to Enforce the Equal Pay Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act?, 59 WASH. L. REv. 549 (1984); Martin Y. Denis, One-
House Veto Legislation: EEOC's Authority to Enforce the Equal Pay and Age Discrimination
in Employment Acts, 66 CHI. B. REC. 98 (1984).
79. EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969, 970 (2d Cir. 1984).
80. See id. at 970-71 (citing Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807, 92
Stat. 3871, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9795-9800.
81. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
82. See id.
83. See 743 F.2d at 975-76.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/24
1997] QUESTIONING THE RETROACTIVITY OF CERCLA
all responsible parties irrespective of the date of dumping. Enactment
of such a provision would ensure that CERCLA covers pre-
enactment polluters and manifests congressional intent to promote the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites at the expense of the polluter.84
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Republican majority in the 104th Congress sought to
enact a non-retroactivity provision, no such legislation was passed. 5
Now it is the responsibility of the 105th Congress to resolve the
retroactivity issue once and for all.86 In light of the key role CERCLA
plays in environmental cleanup and the courts' interpretation of
CERCLA is retroactive, Congress should enact an express
retroactivity provision to ensure CERCLA continues to force
polluters to clean up their respective messes.
David Seidman*
84. See supra note 5.
85. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Questioning Some CERCLA Principles,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1995, at 3 (stating that Congress debated throughout the 104th Congress
whether to amend CERCLA to eliminate the judicially created liability scheme of CERCLA));
News in Brief, Alabama Getaway: Retro is Out, 12 No. 1 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG.
STRATEGY, June 1996, at 8.
86. See Mark A. Hofmann, Election "96 Outcome: More Moderate Risk Reform Seen,
BUS. INS., Nov. 1I, 1996, at 1.
* J.D. 1997, Washington University.
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